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ABSTRACT
Current approaches of phishing filters depend on classifying messages based
on textually discernable features such as IP-based URLs or domain names as
those features that can be easily extracted from a given phishing message.
However, in the same sense, those easily perceptible features can be easily
manipulated by sophisticated phishers. Therefore, it is important that universal
patterns of phishing messages should be identified for feature extraction to
serve as a basis for text classification. In this paper, we demonstrate that user
perception regarding phishing message can be identified in central and
peripheral routes of information processing. We also present a method of
formulating quantitative model that can represent persuasive information
structure in phishing messages. This paper makes contribution to phishing
classification research by presenting the idea of universal information structure
in terms of persuasive communication theories.
1. INTRODUCTION
In our modern day lives, the internet is a unified window to various sources of
information for entertainment, study, healthcare, and many other human
created forms of knowledge products. Emails, as a major method of internet
communication, serve as a personalized channel of communication for the
users to experience such knowledge products in various serviceable forms.
Unfortunately, however, emails are being misused by criminals such that they
appeal to user’s cognition by engineering urgency, authority, or fear in the
email message, induce the user’s mindless response, and steal proprietary
information such as credit card numbers or social security numbers. Such
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online crime is referred to as phishing.
Phishing is online identity theft in which confidential information is obtained
from victims (Emigh, 2005; Kirda & Kruegel, 2006). The crime, moreover, is
spreading fast with the increased share of electronic market place in the retail
market. According to the research conducted by Gartner Research Group
(2005), an estimated 73 million U.S. adults who use the Internet identified that
they received or thought they received an average of more than 50 phishing emails from June 2004 to May 2005. That number represents a growth rate of 28
percent compared with the previous 12-month period, during which 57 million
U.S. adults reported they definitely received or thought they received a phishing
e-mail. Phishing scam is a serious problem for many industries since it has a
great impact on the internet business which is based on the ring of trust between
vendors and consumers. It, coupled with increasing disclosure of unauthorized
access to sensitive consumer data, causes a bad influence on consumer
confidence in making transactions electronically. Companies are worried that
they will lose the ability to leverage low-cost electronic communication channels
with their customers.
Phishing attacks are logistically distinct from spam in that 1) phishing attacks are
more sophisticated, 2) phishing messages are more likely targeted to specific
audience, 3) phishing attacks are more likely to be short-lived, and 4) phishing
related
web
sites
are
dynamically
changing
(MessagingAntiAbuseWorkingGroup & Anti-phishingWorkingGroup, 2006). Technically,
therefore, spam filters are not the best solution for phishing filtering. In other
words, phishing messages are not easily detected by spam filters since the
messages tend to emulate the information structure of legitimate emails.
Consequently, some studies identified phishing specific features and systems
were designed accordingly. Some of the phishing specific features are IP-based
URLs, age of domain names, non-matching URLs, number of links, number of
domains, number of dots, and use of javascript (Drake, Oliver, & Koontz, 2005;
Fett, Sadeh, & Tomasic, 2006). However, it can be argued that easily discernable
features in text, in the same sense, can be easily manipulated by sophisticated
attackers. Updating such phishing features for up-to-date design of phishing
filter can be cumbersome since criminals can use infinite number of ways to
manipulate email messages. Therefore, identifying a fundamental and universal
information structure of phishing messages and designing a set of features for
such information structure are essential. The motivation of this study is urged by
answering the following two fundamental questions in regards to representing
the information structure of phishing messages:

1. Why do people keep deceived by phishing scams?
2. What is the universal pattern of phishing message that
can be applied to different phishing messages?
30
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This study finds explanation of phishing victim’s mindless response from dual
process cognition models. Instead of arguing that heuristic aspect of cognitive
process is responsible for user’s mindless response, in this paper, we
demonstrate that some combinations of dual cognitive processes are related to
user’s trust decision. This paper analyzes phishing email messages in the user
perception level and presents a quantitative model. First, we classify
information structure in phishing email messages based on the variables
measuring components of persuasive transactions. Then, based on the
identified persuasive transaction variables representing dual cognition , in
addition to phishing related variables, we compute a quantitative model that
can represent the combination of dual cognitive processes while providing the
binary prediction whether the message is phishing or not. From the outset, we
argue that the key to the ultimate solution of phishing scam can be found from
people, i.e., the users. Since phishing attacks mainly depend on user’s mindless
response to manipulated email messages (i.e., socially engineered messages),
the victims play a fundamental role in the crime (Merwe, Loock, & Dabrowski,
2005). Therefore, it is important to know how the social engineering is
deployed and used in phishing emails to trick people and how email users
perceive manipulated messages and make trust decision.
The objective of this paper is to present a research framework for phishing
filter feature extraction. Although different approaches have been investigated
to analyze phishing attacks (Adida, Hohenberger, & Rivest, ; Inomata,
Rahman, Okamoto, & Okamoto, ; Jakobsson, 2005; Parno, Kuo, & Perrig,
2005), there has not been an attempt to analyze it in user’s perception level.
This paper provides a framework of a research method in phishing feature
extraction based on information structure derived from robust communication
theories.
This paper describes a pilot analysis with a small sample size. When a sample
size is substantially larger, we expect the same method would provide more
refined results in addition to a richer set of descriptive analysis results. The
remaining sections are organized as follows: Section 2 reviews theoretical
background of this study. In Section 3, the research procedure and variable
selection are discussed. In Section 4, we present the statistical procedure for
verifying dual process cognition model and computing binary prediction
model. In Section 5, limitations of the current study and further study
directions are discussed. Section 6 concludes our paper.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide a theoretical background behind our argument that
message structures in phishing emails can be examined in terms of persuasive
communication theory. Although phishing can be conceptually defined as
manipulation, rather than persuasion, they are not too different when it comes
to message manipulation tactics and message receiver perception processes.
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By using the variables measuring persuasive transactions, we can develop a
quantitative model that represents the structure of persuasive information in
email messages. In a practical sense, phishing emails and legitimate emails
will have different combination and/or contribution of the persuasion variables
and can be distinguished by the equation containing the set of combination and
contribution.
The framework we utilize in this paper is based on persuasive communication
perspective in two folds; components of persuasive transaction guiding
compliance gaining message production and a user cognitive model that
identifies how people would process information in email messages.
Components of persuasive transactions concern message sender’s message
manipulation strategies whereas the user cognitive model concern message
receiver’s information processing model. In summary, message flows of
phishing communication in our argument can be simplified as follows:
Sender message manipulation Æ Receiver information processing Æ Receiver
trust decision.
2.1 Sender’s message manipulation
The art of persuasion has been investigated for several decades since Aristotle
defined various ways of persuasive appeals such as logos (i.e., rational appeal),
pathos (i.e., emotional appeal), and ethos (i.e., appeal through knowledgeable
character). Until today, source characteristics and message characteristics are
major components of persuasive communication. However, since we discuss
communication by means of computers, persuasive transaction components in
this paper are discussed in two broad aspects: Traditional persuasion
approaches and persuasive technology perspective which are more recent
research topics in relation to persuasive interface design.
2.1.1 Source variables and message variables
Traditionally, message contents are studied as a major factor that influences
communication outcome. Hovland et al. (1953), rather than designing a
formal theory about message learning, started with “assumptions” of how
people learn verbal and nonverbal skills. Their assumptions indicate that a
persuasive communication requires a person’s attention and comprehension
concerning the information in the message. After a person attends to the
message and understands it, s/he establishes a connection between the
presented issue and those cognitive responses by mentally repeating the
message arguments. This repeating may result in storage of information in
memory in ways that signify the arguments and conclusion. Although
attention, comprehension, and retention are necessary preconditions for
attitude change, Hovland et al. define incentive (i.e., reward) as a sufficient
precondition. They, in other words, imply that attitude change can occur
when major communication stimuli is not directly related to message
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content.
Source variables and message variables are mainly discussed in this
perspective. Source variables are related to the characteristics of message
sources in relation to persuasion effectiveness. Source credibility in terms
of perceived expertise and trustworthiness is the major concern in the
discussion of source variables (Hovland et al., 1953; McCroskey, 1966).
Other kind of traditional variables, discussed in this paper, in relation to
sender’s message manipulation are message variables. The message
variables concern features of messages that are influential in the process of
persuasive communication. For example, messages can be rationally
appealing to message receivers so that they evaluate evidentiary
information. In other cases, messages can be emotionally appealing so that
message receivers are influenced by fear or guilt in relation to the message
content (O'keefe, 1990; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Stiff & Mongeau, 2003).
2.1.2 Computer related variables
More recently, technology factors are also considered as important factors
influencing communication outcome. In general, computer interfaces are
designed for various purposes such as productivity, entertainment, and
communication. Thus, usability is one of the core factors of interface
design principles. It focuses on functionality of the interface so that users
can complete information transaction without much difficulty if they desire.
However, usability is not necessarily a sufficient condition for users to
actually make transactions. To be successful in fulfilling the goal of
making users actually involved in the transaction, the interface design
should reflect persuasive factors which stimulate user's motivation. Current
research on persuasive interface design investigates human components in
the computer interface which give the users illusory perception as if they
were interacting with human being (Fogg, 2003; Reeves & Nass, 1996).
According to the functional triad (Fogg, 2003), computers can play various
roles in conveying persuasive influence to the users. First, computer as a
tool aids the users in making target behavior easier. For example, one click
shopping in some online retail store can appeal to buyers by reducing
various steps of activities to a few simple steps. In addition, computer as
media can appeal to users by offering vicarious experience. Users can be
motivated by experiencing simulated environment by computers. Lastly,
computers can influence users by interaction with them as if humans do,
namely, social actors.
2.2 Receiver’s information processing
The user cognition model in our interest is a dual process of cognition.
Dual process models of cognition claim that a person's mode of thinking
determines influence on processing of information. The models share
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assumptions about general ideas: 1) there are two relatively distinct modes
of cognitive processing that a person takes, 2) situational and personal
variables affect choice of mode, 3) effects are different depending upon the
mode of process, and 4) influence achieved through receiver’s cognitive
effort is more persistent over time, more resistant to change, and more
predictive of behavior than the heuristic processing mode ("Dual process
persuasion," n.d.).
For the analysis in this paper, we choose Elaboration Likelihood Model
(ELM) since it is widely applied to various applications. The ELM is based
on the idea that attitudes guide decision-making and its following behavior.
The model, therefore, concerns the process to reach the attitude change and
how source, message, receiver, and channel factors affect the mechanism of
message receiver’s cognitive effort in information processing. Petty and
Cacioppo (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) identify that there are two distinctive
routes to the information processing which represent the receiver’s
engagement with various degree of cognitive effort, i.e., central route and
peripheral route. The central route concerns the information that a person
has regarding an object or an issue. Some of the main factors that the
central route focuses are: 1) how the arguments are learned, 2) what kind of
information people create, and 3) how people combine new information
with prior knowledge. The information processing in this route appears to
be rational. Therefore, the message recipient attends to the message
arguments and attempts to scrutinize in order to evaluate them. In contrast,
the peripheral route reflects a very different notion of information
processing. Attitude change is determined by: 1) rewards or punishments
that are associated with the message, 2) simple inferential cues, and 3)
judgmental errors that occur in perceiving message. In the peripheral route,
message perceivers make judgments based on simple cues that source or
message provide.
The primary difference between the two routes is whether the perceiver
engages in active thinking regarding the issue relevant information or not.
In other words, the central route is taken if a perceiver engages in cognitive
effort to process the issue relevant information, whereas the peripheral
route is taken when simple cues are applied with significantly less cognitive
effort than the central route. Therefore, the persuasive effects are distinct
depending on the two routes: influence achieved through receiver’s
cognitive effort is more persistent over time, more resistant to change, and
more predictive of behavior than peripheral processing route. In general,
however, the peripheral route deems to produce persuasive outcome more
easily because people tend to make quick decisions based on peripheral
cues.
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2.3 Research questions
Based on the previous discussion on persuasive transactions and dual process
of cognition, we state the following two research questions:

(1) Would the persuasive information structure in phishing message be
perceived in two distinct routes by the email recipients?
(2) Would the persuasive information structure in phishing message
serve as good features for classifying phishing message from legitimate
message?
Designing a research study and testing collected data for the aforementioned
research questions involves two statistical analyses, i.e., factor analysis and
logistic regression analysis. Factor analysis identifies underlying dimensions
among a set of variables. Therefore, in order to test the dual process
information processing, stated in the research question (1), we conduct a factor
analysis. In addition, logistic regression analysis is used for categorization and
prediction. For designing of potential formula for classifying email messages,
required for answering research question (2), binomial logistic regression is
used.
3. METHOD
In this section, we present the procedures and measures that are used in our
analyses. Sampling procedure, sample selection, content analysis procedure,
and measurements are discussed. Our main method consists of four steps; 1)
feature construction, 2) content analysis, 3) factor analysis, and 4) logistic
regression analysis. Figure 1 illustrates procedures of our methodological
approach.
3.1 Sample Collection
Phishing emails were collected by email feeds from antiphishing.org. Email
feeds are received through info620@gmail.com which was set up particularly
for this project. The feeding began from Aug 16, 2006 adding thousands of
feedings per day. Since the email feedings of antiphishing.org are provided by
members who are not necessarily well aware of the definition of phishing,
some feedings were not phishing emails. Among the provided feedings,
reasonably identifiable as phishing emails are selected in our sample. The
sample for equation generation includes both phishing emails and legitimate
emails. Legitimate emails are collected from personal email accounts.
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Figure 1. Methodological approach of our study

3.2 Variables and Procedures
Variables used for our analyses were selected from a series of studies identified
below. Source variables, message variables, and computer variables are
measured in the five point Likert scale anchoring from 1, not likely, to 5, very
likely. Phishing variables are coded in a binary form to simply represent the
existence of the particular feature. Brief description of each variable is
illustrated in Table 1, and the selection of variables followed descriptions
below.

36

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 2(3)


Source variables and message variables are selected from reviewing
persuasion literature (Hovland et al., 1953; McCroskey, 1966; O'keefe,
1990; Stiff & Mongeau, 2003).



Computer variables are derived from Fogg’s functional triad (Fogg,
2003).



Phishing variables are selected from reviewing phishing related
literature (Drake et al., 2005; Fett et al., 2006)
Table 1. Description of variables used in analyses

Kind of Analysis
Logistic
Regression

Factor
Analysis

Used Variable
Used Variable Item
Components
Category
Source variables Credibility
(Continuous)
Message variables Rational appeals
(Continuous)

Used Variable Item
Measurements
Expertise
Trustworthiness
Perceived rationality of
argument
Perceived plausibility
of evidence
Emotional appeals
Perceived degree of
fear
Tool
Easiness of interaction
Computer
variables
Medium
Vicarious experience
(Continuous)
Social actor
Social experience
Reply address differs
Phishing variables Email address
discrepancy
from the claimed
(Binary)
sender
Quick response
Requiring a quick
response
Collecting info
Collecting information
in the e-mail or links to
web sites that gather
information
Link text discrepancy Link text in e-mail
differs from link
destination or hides
link
Confusing
Uses @ symbol to
destination address
confuse

For different analysis, different set of data was used. For factor analysis, five
different phishing emails were shown to coders. The messages were evaluated
by ten coders based on variables associated with persuasive transactions.
Comrey and Lee (1992) recommend more than 300 cases as decent sample size
for Factor Analysis. It is generally understood that observation under 10 can
cause computational difficulties. Coders spent approximately two minutes to
read one email message. After reading the five emails, coders were asked to
evaluate their impressions about the phishing emails. For logistic regression
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analysis, 16 phishing emails and 8 legitimate emails were used. The emails
used from logistic regression analysis were selected from different pool so that
they do not overlap with the previous five emails shown to the coders. The
coding materials and coding results were delivered electronically. The coders
received instruction, questionnaire, and the emails for analysis through their
emails and the coding results were also submitted via emails.
4. ANALYSES AND RESULTS
In this section, we describe statistical procedures and methods used for our
analyses. Analyses of collected data consist of two major procedures. First,
factor analysis is used for variable classification. Variables are classified for
the validation of a dual process of cognition. From the pool of persuasive
communication variables, we identify underlying dimension (see Table 2).
Once the variables are classified, cases are classified by conducting logistic
regression analysis based on the identified variables as a result of confirmatory
factor analysis in addition to known phishing factors described in the previous
section. The purpose of case classification is to design a quantitative model
that can make predictions on email messages whether they are phishing or not.
Known phishing factors are also refined based on close examination. For
example, company logo factor is filtered out since both legitimate emails and
phishing emails use company logos in their messages. In other words, a
company logo is not a good predictor of discriminating phishing emails from
legitimate ones. Logistic regression analysis offers the proportion of variance
in the dependent variable accounted for by the predictor variables as well as the
relative rank of importance of each predictor variable.
Table 2. Factor Loadings - Rotated Component Matrix
Rotated Component Matrix(a)
Component
1
0.55
0.42
0.02
0.42
0.44
0.16
-0.77
-0.84

Perceived Expertise
Perceived rationality of argument
Perceived plausibility of evidence
Perceived Trustworthiness
Emotional Appeal (e.g., fear)
Easiness of interaction
Vicarious experience
Social experience

2
0.50
0.07
0.09
0.81
-0.63
-0.72
0.06
0.04

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a

Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
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3
-0.52
0.69
0.97
0.14
-0.30
0.07
-0.14
-0.11
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4.1 Factor Analysis
Phishing email persuasive message data were examined by a factor analysis
using Principal Components extraction and Varimax rotation method. Three
factors were extracted and rotated. Each factor was apparently interpretable in
terms of distinct characteristic; Factor 2 represents “peripheral route of
information processing” whereas Factor 3 concerns the “central route of
information processing”. Factor 1 was identified with variables that have
relatively high factor loading values. It seems that computer variables are
separately identified in the user’s information processing scheme of persuasive
message1. The three-factor solution accounted for 73.11 percent of total
variance.
The sum of squared loading after rotation for Factor 2 and Factor 3 are 1.84
and 1.83, respectively. These two factors contribute 45.87% of the total
variance. Factor 2 was composed of variables indicating user’s peripheral route
of information processing such as “perceived trustworthiness”, “emotional
appeal”, and “easiness of interaction”, each reflecting factor loadings of .81, .63, and -.72, respectively. Factor 3 consisted of variables reflecting user’s
central route of information processing such as “Perceived rationality of
argument” and “Perceived plausibility of evidence”, each having factor
loadings of .69, and .97, respectively. The sum of squared loading after rotation
for the factor 1 is 2.17, consisting of variables reflecting illusory experience
with computer interface. The variables were “Vicarious experience” and
“Social experience” with factor loadings of -.77 and -.84, respectively. Factor 1
accounted for 27.23 percent of total variance. “Perceived expertise” loaded
similarly to all factors.
The above results show that variables are identified under distinct dimensions.
First, “perceived rationality of argument” and “perceived plausibility of
evidence” are grouped under a same dimension. We interpret that this
dimension represents central route information processing since the variables
are related to message manipulation that result in more cognitive effort of
message receivers when processing information.
Second, “perceived
trustworthiness,” “emotional appeal,” and “easiness of interaction” are grouped
under a same dimension, representing peripheral route of information
processing. We argue that they are related to message manipulation resulting
in less cognitive involvement when processing main argument of the presented
message. “Vicarious experience” and “social experience” are also grouped
together. We were not able to provide a proper interpretation of this particular
dimension in terms of dual process cognition model. However, we expect that
variable grouping can be more refined when the sample size is larger.
1

We expect that the pattern would be different with a larger sample size. Current data shows a
distinction between traditional persuasive transaction and computer persuasive transaction.
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4.2 Logistic Regression Analysis
A logistic regression analysis was conducted to examine multivariate
predictors of phishing discrimination. Logistic regression can be used to
predict a dependent variable on the basis of continuous and/or categorical
predictor variables and to determine the percent of variance in the dependent
variable explained by the predictors. Logistic regression is a linear classifier,
similar to Gaussian Naïve Bayes, that shows function approximation learning
algorithms as statistical estimators or functions (Mitchell, 2006; Roos, Wettig,
Grunwald, Myllymaki, & Tirri, 2005). With this analysis, a regression
equation is created that can predict whether the email is phishing or not.
Since phishing variables are theory-driven and we used different dimensions of
variables together in the analysis, we used a forward stepwise method instead
of Enter method in SPSS management. The predictor variables entered for the
analysis are perceived trustworthiness, perceived rationality of argument,
perceived plausibility of evidence, emotional appeal, easiness of interaction,
vicarious experience, social experience, email address discrepancy, quick
response requirement, collecting personal information or not, link text
discrepancy, and destination address confusion.
The result identified that the logistic model (100%) had more effective
prediction rate than the null model (69.6%). The logistic model was
significantly associated with the binary prediction of phishing (χ2 (2) = 28.26,
p<.0001). The suggested equation for the logistic model is stated as below;

f (phishing) = 18.07 + (38.39)* Email address discrepancy
+ (-37.82)* Confusing destination address
Furthermore, the insignificant Hosmer–Lemeshow test ( 2 (1) = 0, p>.05)
shows that the null hypothesis of a good model fit to data was acceptable. In
other words, the model was a good fit to the data. Therefore, when the data of
“Email address discrepancy” and “Confusing destination address” are given we
can predict whether the email is phishing or not with 100% accuracy.
However, this analysis resulted from only 23 cases of dataset. Since optimal
number of observation should be much larger than 23, this analysis only shows
methodological approach rather than presenting substantial finding.
5. DISCUSSION
In the sections above, statistical analyses of phishing email structure were
presented. Factor analysis classified variables to verify dual process of
cognition. Logistic regression analysis presented a potential classifier model
that could offer binary prediction. In this section, first, major limitations of
this paper are discussed. Although we already identified that this study is for
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suggesting a research framework, the sample size is an inevitable problem in
statistical analysis. Potential limitations of theory adoption and measurement
limitation are also discussed.
Without an optimal sample size, this study only shows the research framework
instead of significant research results. Unfortunately our preliminary analysis
does not result in an equation that contains persuasive transactional
components in the predictor variables. Although the result showed that the
logistic model would classify phishing with 100 percent accuracy, the equation
consists of only phishing features. We expected that the equation would reflect
components of persuasion variables when the sample size is large enough since
the main point of our argument is that persuasive information structure should
work as universal features across different kinds of phishing messages.
In this paper, we only adopted parts of core components of persuasive
transactions. In real life situations, more various principles of persuasion can
be applied to communications. For example, receiver involvement is a critical
component in persuasive communication. If a message receiver is personally
involved in the issue presented in the message, it is more likely that the
message receiver engage in critical evaluation of the presented message.
However, the receiver factor was ignored in our research design since we only
looked at sender and message perspectives in that the phishing message was
analyzed in terms of sender’s message manipulation strategy. However,
adoption of persuasive theories may be more refined to consider different
perspectives of persuasion.
Measurements used for feature values for this paper was subjective measures
which represent user perception. It is a challenging task to represent human
perception for the tasks of text classification. System implementation can be
difficult and/or uneconomical since there should be an additional system which
should function as a reference to signify the feature set representing persuasive
component.
6. CONCLUSION
Investigating information structure of phishing email can provide system
designers with a novel idea of phishing detecting mechanism. In this paper, we
demonstrated that user perception regarding phishing message can be identified
in two distinct ways of information processing, i.e., central route and peripheral
route. We also identified a quantitative model that represents persuasive
information structure in email messages. We claim that the model can be used
for classifying phishing emails from legitimate emails. In particular, we
proposed a method to design a set of features for the classification based on a
dual process model of cognition.
The results of this study indicate that persuasive components in phishing
messages can be identified as a set of features for phishing detection
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mechanism. The results are significant in that the identified set of features
using our method can potentially be used for the design of phishing filter which
does not required frequent feature update. The features extracted from our
method would serve as a universal pattern of phishing email messages.
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